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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Aporetic Witness 
Susan Biesecker-Mast 
Introduction 
I do not think that we live in a pluralistic world, if by that we mean 
a global context in which every difference is valued the same as every 
other. On the contrary, in our world white is better off than black, the 
West encroaches on the East, Microsoft beat Apple, and the logic of 
capitalism governs all circuits of exchange that matter. 
Of course, today's differences are not the same as yesterday's dif-
ferences. Whereas yesterday's differences tended to be viewed as natu-
ral, given, and immutable, today's differences tend to be seen as cul-
tural, historical, and contingent. But even if today's differences are con-
sidered contingent and thus more easily changed, they .are ranked and 
compared nonetheless. Even the constantly changing differences (or 
products) of consumer capitalism are valued and organized. 
To test this point, try to convince an adolescent that a pair of Nike 
athletic shoes is just as cool as a pair of Airwalk athletic shoes. The very 
logic that makes it possible to sell the latest anything- be it a shoe, a mi-
nivan, a computer-presumes that "newer" is better, even if what is 
"newer" these days looks like something from the fifties. In short, ours is 
a world that turns on the better and worse, not the different but equal. 
If differences are hierarchized, then they are ordering our world so 
that some people, things, and styles are valued while others are deval-
ued. But if c!i£ferences are not immutable, then we may be able to change 
them and, thereby, alter what is considered true and untrue, worthy and 
unworthy, wise and unwise. Hence, to use the shoe example again, al-
though it is unlikely that you will succeed in convincing the adolescent 
that one brand of shoe is just as good as another, it is possible. 
As Anabaptists we have known throughout our history that the 
current order is never the same as God's reign. Until the reign of God is 
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fully realized there will always be a very big difference between God's 
way and the ways we human beings make sense out of differences. 
But while the chasm between our world and the reign of God has 
not changed over time, what may be different for us now is that 
postmodernity-this context of hierarchized but changing 
differences-may be an opportunity for our witness to make a differ-
ence. Whereas in the recent past we attempted to differ from a world that 
was largely lmwilling to alter its course known as "progress," today we 
may find ourselves wihlessing to a world that, though still hierarcruzed 
in troubling ways, finds new plausibility in our alternative. 
The opportunity that this shift from modernity to poshnodernity 
may have opened for faith to speak to reason has not gone unnoticed by 
theolOgians. Indeed a number of what we might call poshnodern theo-
logians have advocated various ways that Christians ought to wihless in 
their contemporary context. However, because these theologians have 
tended to mistake our postmodern world for a pluralistic world, they 
also have tended to write theolOgies that promote cultural security over 
faithful wihless. 
Three Theological Responses 
to Postmodernity 
The Communitarian Response 
The communitarian response (also known as postliberal theology) 
is perhaps the postmodern theology that takes most seriously the 
proposition that we live in a pluralistic world.] According to communi-
tarians, religions do not consist of God's singular truth or express some 
core Christian experience. Instead, they are cultural-linguistic con-
structs. They are culturally specific, since each is constituted by the par-
ticular place and moment out of which it emerges, and linguistic, since 
each is governed by a set of rules or doctrines with which any particular 
utterance (whether sermon or ritual) must comply; Tal<en together, 
then, religions are differently born and governed-pluralistic. 
Although, for communitarians, religions will consist of versions 
that differ according to their culture and time, those versions can be 
comparatively evaluated. Versions that are more internally coherent or 
more consistent with the ancient doctrines of the faith should be evalu-
ated more favorably. Thus, a version whose theology is most rational 
and whose utterances conform best to the idiom of classic Christianity 
should be considered "unsurpassable" compared to the rest.2 
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Communitarians argue, then, both that we live in a pluralistic 
world and that we should rank religions as better or worse. I agree that 
we should evaluate religions as better or worse, though I am not clear on 
their rationale for doing so, given their presumption that our world is 
pluralistic. In any case, I disagree with their criteria, which insist that a 
religion conform to the Enlightenment's standards of reason and require 
that a version of a religion reiterate the oldest doctrines of its faith. 
The first criterion is troubling because it obliges us to fully subject 
religion to reason. Although Christianity may make compelling and 
logical arguments, as a discourse of faith, Christianity ought also to be 
allowed to outstrip reason. 
The second criterion preswnes that versions that abide by the old-
est doctrines are the best. For an eschatological religion like Christianity 
such a criterion seems ill-suited since it will always prefer those versions 
of Christianity that reflect what Christianity has been as opposed to 
what it is called to become. Taken together, these two modes of evalua-
tion appear to work against Christianity since they favor a conservative 
version of a decidedly utopian discourse. 
The Triumphaiistic Response 
Like the commwutari.an response, the triumphalistic response as-
swnes that we live in a pluralistic world. Unlike communitarians, tri-
umphalists do not consider this change in context to be an occasion to 
think of Christianity as particular to the culture or cultures out of which 
it emerges.3 Instead, triumphalists take postrnodenuty to be an occasion 
to spread the word more widely. 
With the end of modernity and its accompanying confidence in 
reason, triwnphalists argue, comes an opportunity for God to become 
relevant again. People are ready, they say, to consider that God may 
have a role in the universe, that religion may be important for a moral 
society, that God is central for hope, and that God may help human be-
ings resist the excesses of science. 
For triwnphalists, the end of modenuty represents the liberation of 
God from philosophic and scientific assumptions that had rendered re-
ligion irrelevant. Such liberation enables Christians to make their case 
that God is central to life. Christians should not squander such an op-
portunity, triumphalists argue, but instead should seek to penetrate the 
whole world with Christian questions, values, and answers. Thus Chris-
tians will remake the world for God. Triumph indeed. 
For Anabaptist Christians whose spiritual ancestors were executed 
by an imperial Christendom, such a response should be disturbing. Tri-
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umphalists take our postmodern world only as an opportunity to exert 
all available influence so as to make our world over into their own par-
ticular Christian likeness. TIleir disturbing call ignores democratic poli-
tics, which are our inheritance from modernity and which were in-
vented largely to protect freedom of religion. Indeed, the triumphalist 
response seems to be an attempt, however unwitting, to return to the 
days before modern democratic politics-that is, before discourses of 
freedom, conscience, and choice had sway. 
In short, the triumphalist response is a call for a return to dlfisten-
dom. As such it is an imperialistic call that responds to today's diversity 
with an attempt to make all others the same. 
The Constructionist Response 
Somewhere between the communitarianresponse, which is as cul-
turally isolating as it is conservative, and the triumphalistic response, 
which sends the Christian out into the world but only to dominate it, we 
find the constructionist response.4 Like communitarians and trium-
phalists, constructionists accept the proposition that ours is a pluralistic 
world characterized by culturally specific and ultimately fowldation-
less differences. Unlike communitarians, however, constructionists do 
not theorize themselves into a culturally isolating corner. On the con-
trary, constructionists argue that Christians must leave their communi-
ties and meet the other because others are similar to God insofar as they 
are, like God, a mystery. 
As constructionists seek to move beyond the borders of their com-
munities, they do not aim, as triumphalists do, to dominate the rest of 
the world. Instead of trying to make every other into their own image, 
constructionists want to engage the other in a manner that respects djf-
ference. One way to characterize constructionists, then, would be as 
commwutarians pursuing a culturally sensitive public theology. 
Of the tllfee postmodern theological responses to our supposed 
pluralistic condition, the constructionist response is the most promising, 
because it takes seriously the culturally constructed character of any 
version of any religion without retreating to cultural isolation. It seeks to 
be an outward-looking yet nondominating theology as it calls us to con-
verse with and be converted by the other. Indeed, these are well-made 
aims for these times in wluch our recognition of difference and our love 
of neighbor call us to seek the other ou t wi thout also seeking to make the 
other over into an image of our self. But can these claims give full ac-
count of the deathly danger inherent to a concrete dlfistian wih1ess? I 
do not think so. 
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I agree with constructionists that God and the stranger are myster-
ies. I also agree that we are obliged as Christians to seek out both. And I 
agree, as constructionists further argue, that doing so is risky. Yet I can-
not understand why we should expect, as Scott Holland has argued, that 
contact with the other will always be an enriching experience. 
In an essay in which Holland advances a constructionist theology 
vis-a-vis the work of David Tracy, he says that the Christian theologian 
will venture out because "she has counted the cost. She is convinced that 
a deepened self-consciousness, God-consciousness, and cosmic con-
sciousness comes only through a creative hermeneutics of genuine con-
versation with the other .... " 5 
If counting the cost means that the outcome can be calculated in 
advance, then again I fail to see the risk. If I know beforehand that no 
matter who or what the other is, no matter what our conversation yields, 
I will be better off, then I have really ventured nothing at all. 
As I said, I agree that the other is really other. But that being so, I do 
not think we can ever know in advance what the outcome of any inter-
action will be and whether, when we are done, we will be better or worse 
off. The cost of discipleship is, as Jesus insists, a self-denying, enemy 
love that surpasses all calculation of gain or loss. 
Derrida's Religious Turn 
As Anabaptists, we should seek a mode of Christian witness that is 
radical, defenseless, and gutsy for these times. To pursue such a witness, 
I suggest we consider the work of a postmodern philosopher who is 
usually passed over by postmodern Christian theologians but whose 
recent turn toward religion may teach us much about how we Anabap-
tists may give a confident witness in postmodernity.6 I am referring to 
Jacques Derrida and his recent reading of Kierkegaard's interpretation 
of the story of Abraham and Isaac in his book, The Gift of Deat11. 
Derrida is poststructuralist. This means that he takes structuralism 
so seriously as to push it to its own limits. Structuralists argue that signs 
have meaning only in relation to other signs and that their meaning is 
not a more or less accurate reflection of reality but, instead, a human 
construct and social convention. Thus, "cat" is "cat" only insofar as it is 
not" dog," and not because it refers to something like cat-ness per se. 
Structuralists also argue that although meaning is not an effect of 
rea lity, it is nonetheless regular. Since a sign signifies in relation to other 
signs, its mean.ing will remain fixed by those very relations. In other 
words, signs work in structures of relations among signs that keep their 
meaning constant. Thus the name "structuralism."7 
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Derrida, however, stretches structuralism to its limits and, in the 
opinion of many, opens up some fascinating and surprising avenues of 
thought. According to John D. Caputo, one of Derrida's most informed 
commentators and explicators, Derrida makes at least two crucial con-
tributions to structuralism that have the effect of constituting poststruc-
turalisrn. 
The first is Derrida's claim that although meaning is governed by 
the logic or system of relations that allows any sign to signify, meaning is 
no more determined by that logic than it is by reality. As Caputo ex-
plains it, 
Derrida argues that, though rule-bowld up to a point . . . the play of 
traces [or gaps between signs that are their "quasi" condition of possi-
bility] is not a "closed system" but ultimately an open-ended play. He 
argues against the "closure" of the play and holds that the effects of 
which "iterability," the code of repeatability, is capable CaJ.U10t in prin-
ciple be contained, programmed, or predicted. It always [is] possible, 
in principle, as a "structural" matter, to repeat differently; that is built 
right into the very idea of "iterability" or "repetition."s 
In other words, Derrida argues not only that we make meaning of 
the world by way of binary structures, rather than by way of a corre-
spondence between word and thing, but also that these structures are 
not universal, trans-historical, or determining, as structuralism has 
held. Thus, although structures shape our utterances, so too may our ut-
terances work on our structures. 
Derrida's second contribution, according to Caputo, is to notice 
that language is not unique in these attributes. Whether we are talking 
about commercials, paintings, commodities, or people, meaning or 
order is made all the time by this operation of signs set in relation to 
other signs according to some one or another logic. Again, Caputo: 
In addition to arguing against closw'e, Derrida also generalizes what 
was originally a linguistic model ... so that differance [or how signs 
signify by differing from other signs aJ.ld also deferring the meaJ.ung of 
other signs] is not restricted to laJ.lguage but leaves its "mark" on 
everything-institutions, sexuality, the worldwide web, the body, 
whatever you need or want. This does not amount to aJ.·guing that 
these things are all linguistic. . .. Rather he is aJ.·guing that, like a laJ.l-
guage, all these structures are maJ.·ked by the play of differences, by 
the "spacing" of wluch differance is one of the names.9 
Thus, structuralism is stretched beyond its limits to all modes of 
making meaning. The rules of grammar and the rule-breaking potential 
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of every utterance apply equally as well to every sphere of human activ-
ity. So, for instance, punk dress disrupted the economy of fashion as it 
fetishized the old in a system utterly dependent on "the newest." 
Let me highlight two aspects of Derrida' s thought that are particu-
larly crucial and often misunderstood. First, Derrida's poststructuralist 
theory is antiessentialist but not relativist. To be sure, Derrida does say 
that signs are discontinuous with reality. But he does not say that they 
are all the same or that they are all valued the same. On the contrary, for 
Derrida, signs are products of differences that matter. In order for any 
one sign to signify, it must be set in relation to other signs according to 
which some signs are valued more than others. Some historical exam-
ples include the privileging of white over black in racism, man over 
woman in patriarchy, and profit over gift in capitalism. 
Second, Derrida's thought is critical but not nihilistic. Derrida's 
work often involves interrogating the meanings, orders, and hierarchies 
that we have produced. Yet he does so, I think, not to rid of us meaning 
or order per se but, instead, to put us on the track of what has not yet 
been. 
As human beings we cannot but make meaning and, in doing so, to 
set up hierarchies and to privilege some things over other things. For 
Derrida, however, the fact that we must make meaning-that we do not 
have the choice but to say this is better than that-does not absolve us of 
the responsibility to examine what systems of privilege we make or re-
produce. So whenever we make meaning we are obliged, according to 
Derrida, to look out for what must have been put aside in the act of 
meaning-making. When we do that, says Derrida, we set out on the track 
of how our world might be otherwise than we have made it. In this way 
Derrida's thought is hopeful and creative, not nihilistic and destructive. 
I believe that Derrida's thought may be well-suited to our non-
foundationalist and nonpluralistic times. Enlightenment groundings 
have slipped out from under us, but meanings and hierarchies have not 
disappeared. Derrida's work may help us to appreciate these twin con-
temporary conditions and, more importantly, may guide us toward 
making our world otherwise. But can Derrida help us remain faithful to 
Christianity and, more speCifically, to our Anabaptist heritage? 
As mentioned above, Derrida has recently turned to religious dis-
courses and specifically Christianity. Indeed in The Gift of Death, Derrida 
offers readings of a number of texts including Kierkegaard's interpreta-
tion of the story of Abraham and Isaac10 to give us a genealogy of the 
ethical subject that points us toward a new kind of ethical subjectivity, 
one that is, according to Derrida, decidedly Christian.II 
THE APORETIC WITNESS • 137 
Derrida's attention to religious discourse, I believe, may teach us 
much about right relations and confident witness because Derrida's 
ethical subject is constituted in and by certain difficult relations with 
others. To flesh out all too briefly Derrida's ethical subject, I will seek to 
describe it in relationship to three others that are crucial for ethics, his-
tory, and sociality. These others are God, the future, and other people. 
One of the lessons we can draw from Derrida's reading of the Old 
Testament story of Abraham and Isaac, in which Abrallam is asked by 
God to sacrifice his beloved son, is that God is utterly incomprehensible 
to us mortals. We cannot begin to understand how our God could ask 
such a thing of Abraham. There is no reason we can conjure to rational-
ize the demand of such a deed. And yet God asks it. 
This is a God, Derrida suggests, that is beyond us or who might be 
described as the tout autre, the altogether other. Yet the Bible teaches us, 
Derrida points out, that this is a God of infinite goodness too. This is a 
God of unfathomable creativity, generosity, and forgiveness. Indeed, 
God's infinite goodness is every bit a part of God's otherness. Unlike us 
fallen beings, who break our promises, sell our souls, and betray our 
loved ones, God is goodness through and through. 
Such goodness is not an object (as the Good was an object12 in Pla-
to's philosophy) that we might possess by holding it in our sight or 
comprehending it with our reason. Rather, it is an other. This, Derrida 
argues, is the particular brilliance of Christianity: 
A personal gaze, that is, a face, a figure, and not a sun [as in Plato's 
philosophy]. The Good becomes personal Goodness, a gaze that sees 
me without my seeing it. 
Not as a thing but rather as an other, such goodness is available for 
relation. We can be in relation to it. Indeed, argues Derrida, the Christian 
subject is one who has taken up a relation with goodness, with God. 
God as goodness, then, is not something Christians can ever get 
their heads all the way around. Such goodness eludes us even as we are 
in relation to it. It is beyond us, as that which sees and knows us all of the 
time and that which we know is nearby but which we cannot see. As 
Derrida puts it, "God sees without being seen." 
Knowing as much, we interiorize God's goodness in God's watch-
fulness. Whatever we do, we never can it do entirely in secret since God 
is with us all the time. These are the beginnings, then, of the ethical sub-
ject, argues Derrida: one, who in being in relation to the God of goodness 
and the God of all knOwing, knows her works do matter as good or bad 
in God's eyes. 
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The second lesson we may learn from Derrida's engagement with 
Christianity is that the future is open. Of course, our modes of making 
sense of our world, all the structures of language and order we have 
built, will constrain us. We will tend toward the reiteration of what has 
already been the case. That is the historical burden of the world we hu-
mans have made in all its materiality. 
And yet, the future is not determined by what we have already 
done. Rather, its outlines and logic elude us too. h, this sense, Derrida 
argues, history is a problem because we cannot bring it under control: 
TI,e moment the problem [of history] were to be resolved that same 
totalizing closure would determine the end of history: it would bring 
in the verdict of nonhistoricity itself. History can be neither a de-
cidable object nor a totality capable of being mastered .... 13 
History itself, Derrida is arguing, presumes the open-endedness of 
a future we cannot predict since history is the opening up of one mo-
ment to another that is other. No narrative of progress, no story of revo-
lution, no relation of dialectical terms can anticipate or contain the 
transformation of the present into its other, the future. 
That this is so, says Derrida, is downright scary: 
We tremble in that strange repetition that ties an inefutable past ... to 
a future that cannot be anticipated; anticipated but unpredictable; ap-
prehended, but, and this is why there is a future, apprehended precisely 
as unforeseeable, wl.predictable; approached as Wl.approachable. Even 
if one thinks one knows what is going to happen, the new instant of 
that happening remains Wl.touched, still Wl.accessible, in fact 
wilivable.14 
Yet in that fear of what we cannot know in advance lies the possi-
bility of the impossible. ill the undecidability of the future is the possi-
bility that the truly impossible, say, perhaps the reign of God, may in-
deed come to pass. 
The third lesson of Derrida's turn to religion and, in particular, to 
Christianity is that just as God is other, so too is every person also other. 
There can be, says Derrida, no substitute of one of us for the other-not 
really, anyway. One of us might sometime sacrifice ourselves so that an 
other may be spared. Even so that other one will never be spared death 
for good. One day death will come. Each of us is concrete, particular, and 
finite: 
Because I cannot take death away from the other who can no more 
take it from me in return, it remains for everyone to take his own 
death 011 himself· Everyone must asSume his own death, that is to say 
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the one thing in the world that no one else can either give or take: therein 
resides freedom and responsibility.ls 
What mortality means, according to Derrida, is not that we are each 
unique individuals according to an ideology of indivi.dualism but, 
rather, that we are each singular. We may be like one another as, say 
Americans, but we are irreplaceable to one another. This is crucial, ar-
gues Derrida, for in that singularity is not only the possibility but also 
the obligation that we be responsible for ourselves. Since none other can 
live or die as any other, then each of us must take it on ourselves to do 
Our deeds and to be held accountable for them. 
Moreover, argues Derrida, our singularity is of God. Since God is 
wholly other, then everything that is also other is also of God. Thus, just 
as I cannot really apprehend God, so too I cannot really wlderstand any 
other human being. Every other person is always, in the final instance 
and despite any similarities, a mystery to me. Hence, I can neither fully 
comprehend her, nor generalize to her, nor predict her. She outstrips my 
power to understand, as I do hers. 
Free to Choose and 
Responsible to Choose Well 
As Derrida shows in his reading of the story of Abraham and Isaac, 
Abraham hears clearly God's command that he sacrifice his son but 
catmot pOSSibly imagine what God means to be done. What can God as 
infinite goodness have in mind in this abhorrent command? God's will 
eludes Abraham; still he must choose whether to obey or to defy. 
Therein lies a beginning for Abraham's ethical subjectivi ty: he has a 
choice insofar as he faces both goodness in God and the unknowability 
of God's will. As one who is in God's gaze and is of God, he seeks to 
choose well. Further, this choice is his responsibility. He will be ac-
countable for it. Abraham cannot pass the responsibility of his choice on 
to God, even though it is God's command, because only Abraham and 
no one else, not even God, is in the position of choosing whether or not 
he will put the knife to Isaac's throat. 
Thus Our relation to God as wholly other gives us our freedom to 
choose in the face of goodness and our burden of responsibility to 
choose well. If God were not wholly other, if we could know in advance 
precisely what God would have us do, then we would have no choice at 
all.H is the being held accotmtable (in God's gaze) and the not knowing 
(God's will) that forms what Derrida calls the aporia, or impOSSibility, of 
responsibility that is the condition of possibility for ethics. 
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The undecidability that constitutes an action as a choice and that is 
an effect of the subject's relation to God is closely related to an effect of 
the second relation-that is, between the subject and the future. As I ex-
plained above, Derrida theorizes history as open-ended, capable of any-
thing. This means that what we do in the here and now is of the utmost 
importance. Since the future is not over-determined by the past, it re-
mains sufficiently open that our actions may have the power to shape 
the as-not-yet. 
In short, the future is our responsibility. By that I do not mean that 
Derrida's ethical subject is saturated with a power to make the world 
into whatever she or he desires. Derrida is not resurrecting the modern 
subject who is entirely the agent of her own destiny. The burden of his-
tory is great. But in that burden are the traces of all the choices we did not 
make or that we sought to eschew and that, thereby, remain latent and 
available. n1e world might have been otherwise; thus it can yet be oth-
erwise. What it will be, this new ethical subject cannot say. Still it is her 
responsibility in the face of the infinite goodness of God to endeavor to 
make the choices and take the actions to make it better. That this re-
sponsibility before God and the future is as biblical as it is terrifying, 
Derrida makes abtmdantly clear: 
h1 the Epistle to the Philippians 2:12, the disciples are asked to work 
towards their salvation in fear and trembling. They will have to work 
for their salvation knowing all along that it is God who decides: the 
other has no reason to give to us and nothing to settle in our favor, no 
reason to share his reasons with us. We fear and tremble because we 
are already in the hands of God, although free to work, but in the 
hands and under the gaze of God, whom we don't see and whose will 
we cannot know, no more than the decisions he will hand down, nor 
his reasons for wanting this or tllat, our life or death, our salvation or 
perdition. We fear and tremble before the inaccessible secret of a God 
who decides for us although we remain responsible, that is, free to de-
cide, to work, to assume our life and our death. 16 
Finally, as I have said, Derrida constitutes this new ethical subject 
not only in relation to God who is wholly other and to a future that is 
other than the past, but also to every other person. This ethical subject is 
to act toward goodness and a better future always through relation to an 
other. 
This is an impOSSible responsibility. It is impossible because we 
cannot really know the other. How are we to be good to the other when 
we cannot fully understand that person's needs, desires, experiences, 
motives, and deeds? It is impossible because whenever the subject seeks 
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to be good to another, she or he is by necessity neglecting some other 
other. There is no getting around such limits. Insofar as each of us is sin-
gular, £.inite, and irreplaceable, we can only make one response at a time. 
Abraham is acutely aware of this aspect of being an ethical subject. 
Abraham can only serve God, the wholly other, at the expense of an-
other other, his beloved son Isaac. He cannot be good to both. In fact, he 
can only serve the one, in this case, by doing a terrible thing to the other. 
That is not merely an ethical dilemma. This is the very crux of being an 
ethical subject: that in choosing to do well by someone, the subject is by 
necessity slighting another. 
For Derrida, then, there can be no purity, no comfort, and no self-
righteousness in ethical action. Every good deed is at least a deferring of 
some other goodness left undone. If we are to be ethical subjects, Derrida 
is saying, we must bear the burden of all the options we did not take. 
Now, of course, God spared Abraham the evil deed, in the £.inal mo-
ment. But, says Derrida, he did not spare Abrallam the act of choosing. 
When God removes the command, Derrida argues, he only does so after 
Abraham has already made his son a gift of sacrifice to God. Only when 
Abraham exceeds all expectation of anything in rerum from God (what 
could God give to compensate for such a deed?), does God remove the 
command and, in so doing, give Abraham everything. 
Such generosity, a giving that exceeds every expectation of a bal-
ance sheet, every hope for a return, is what Derrida admires most in 
Christianity. When we face the other, Derrida is saying, we are called to 
give beyond any economy of expected return, even beyond the hope 
that we will feel good about ourselves. Since we are mortal and finite 
beings, we do not have the luxury of giving to one without denying 
some other. Thus the ethical subject will always find herself in an im-
possible position of seeking to express God's infinite goodness by a gift, 
all the while knowing that her gift will come up short: 
I have never been and never will be up to the level of this infinite 
goodness nor up to the immensity of the gift, the frameless immensity 
that must in general define ... a gift as such. 11us guilt is originary, 
like original sin. Before any fault is determined, I am guilty inasmudl 
as I am responsible .... Guilt is inherent in responsibility because re-
sponsibility is always wlequal to itself: one is never responsible 
enough17 
If we are to do good, if we are to be ethical subjects, Derrida is ar-
guing, not only must we not expect a return from the other, we must also 
not anticipate some assurance that our gift proves our goodness. Insofar 
as we are mortal, our gifts will always fall short and our self-satisfaction 
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will never be forthcoming. Only God, who is infinite goodness, can 
judge the relative worth of our meager, though necessary, attempts. 
Toward an Anabaptist Response 
Our desire to theorize a confident witness in a pluralistic world is 
motivated by all the right impulses: the impulse to tell the truth and the 
impulse to do so ethically-that is, defenselessly. As I argued at the be-
ginning of this essay, I do not think we live in a pluralistic world in 
which all differences are valued the same. Still I believe the twin im-
pulses to tell the truth and to do so defenselessly. That is because, 
though I am no relativist, I do recognize that we live in a world of differ-
ences that are not what they used to be. Whereas in the modem context 
differences were viewed as fixed by the laws of nature, these days they 
are hierarchized according to relatively transitory rules. 
Because our world is ordered by hierarchies that cause tremendous 
suffering, we must speak the liberating truth of the gospel. However, 
because we now recognize that our differences are not natural but, in-
stead, synthetic, we must think the manner of our telling anew. We must 
remake a witness for a world of differences in which there are no natural 
anchors for selfhood. Thus the question, put simply, is how do we wit-
ness to the other without defensively protecting the self. 
The most relevant feature of the Anabaptist tradition for this wit-
ness in my view is its concrete rather than abstract character. As Robert 
Friedman argued, Anabaptist theology cannot in principle be formu-
lated into a system, because of its "existential" refusal to separate faith 
from li£e.J8 Or, as John Howard Yoder has put it so well, "That Jesus 
Christ is Lord is a statement not about my llmer piety or my intellect or 
ideas but about the cosmos."19 
If our witness is to be, as Yoder and Friedmann have suggested, 
concrete in character and cosmic in scope, then we must offer our wit-
ness without reservation and with both body and spirit. We must give 
up those forms of Christianity which, as Michael Sattler wrote, seek "to 
obey God with soul and not also with the body ."20 However, as we have 
learned from Derrida, such full-bodied and spirited efforts to tell God's 
truth must, to be ethical practices, at every instance choose whether such 
witness will take the form of a confident claim or a critical question. 
The Aporetic Witness 
For our witness to be confident yet ethical, it must be aporetic. That 
is, it must be structured by an aporia, or two options that are as neces-
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sary as they are mutually exclusive. These two options will not be sub-
ject in the final instance either to a hierarchy or a synthesis. We will not 
be able to settle on always privileging one over the other. Nor will we be 
able to create out of the two of them some third option that resolves the 
tension between them. They will be irreducibly opposed. 
Therefore, every time we come to a moment of witness we will 
have to choose all over again. That will always be our burden. But that 
will also be the condition of possibility for our doing witness as ethical 
subjects since the undecidability of the aporetic witness will put us in a 
position to choose. 
Of course, in choosing, we will also always come up short since, in 
truth, whatever we do will be only part of the full task. As Gayatri Chak-
ravorty Spivak has recently said: 
A dilemma is just a task of thinking, whereas an aporia is a practical 
fact. An aporia is a situation where one choice cancels out another, but 
a choice must be made. You can't exist in an aporia.2J 
\ 
h1Sofar as aporia represents a moment that demands an impossible 
choice, it is, so to speak, where the action and, thus, ethics is. 
So what will be our options? One option of the aporetic witness will 
require that we tell the truth as we know it and that we do so as persua- . 
sively as we can. We will make compelling arguments with strong evi-
dence and solid reasoning. We will also make appeals that seek to moti-
vate our hearer's desire toward Jesus' teachings. 
Of course, we will seek to make of ourselves an example for our 
case. Thus our truth telling will not be limited to our words-it will 
consist in every mode of our daily living as well. We will tell the truth of 
all things to the other so that we might be instruments for that person's 
transformation. We will evangelize. That is, we will witness in the sense 
of testifying to the truth we have come to know. 
How shall we come to know such truth? We will come to know it 
through careful readings of biblical texts, as well as texts of our Anabap-
tist heritage in the context of our community of believers. We will dis-
cover it in the life and teachings of Jesus as we come to these through our 
historical tradition. Thus we will read as a community the texts of the 
New Testament and especially the Sermon on the Mount alongside the 
MarttJrs Mirror, our confessions of faith, and a wealth of historical and 
theological interpretations of that rich heritage. 
We know that we carmot learn the truth either alone or from a neu-
tral position. We must do it together, so that we can discuss competing 
interpretations, hear the differences, and seek to choose the truth. We 
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must do it from within the perspectives and biases of our tradition be-
cause that is who we are. We neither can nor should seek to escape our 
history. Rather, we should bring our history, and thereby ourselves, into 
a lively engagement with biblical texts and especially Jesus as our model 
to discern the truth. 
The other option of the aporetic witness will require that we not 
give witness to the truth as we know it, but rather that we seek to witness 
precisely the truth we do not know. Since we are not omniscient, since 
we do not know all, we are assured that we do not own the truth. Our 
tradition, no matter how rich, cannot contain God's truth. 
If we ever were to come to know all truth, Genesis tells us, we 
would be mortals no more. We would be gods. And that is simply not for 
us to be. Whenever we proclaim the truth as we know it, then, we are 
surely also telling nontruth. The whole truth is simply not ours to tell. 
God's full truth always eludes us precisely because it is, as God is, other 
than us. So just as we are telling the truth as best we know it, we can be 
sure that somewhere in some trace we are leaving behind is something 
of God's truth that we have missed. We will miss a point or smooth over 
a paradox or even out a tension and, just as we do so, some truth of God 
will escape our notice. 
As witnesses, then, we must put ourselves on the track of those 
truths that elude us. We must be relentlessly on the lookout for what we 
have missed or ignored or hidden. 
When we choose this option, we will be undoing the rules, pushing 
through the boundaries, shaking up the logics by which we have per-
haps ordered our community or by which others have organized our 
world. As we seek out the truth that has not yet been, we will take on a 
terrible burden. Chances are we will cause confusion, loss for ourselves 
and for others. That will be our doing, and we will have to take respon-
sibility for it. To be sure, if our pursuit involves upsetting the status quo 
for those who enjoy disproportionate power, we will be held account-
able. But we will have to choose this option now and again because, if we 
don't, we will have forfeited our relationship to God as the wholly other. 
As should be clear, we cannot reiterate the truths of our tradition 
and community while at the same time pursuing the traces of those 
truths which would undo our truths. There can be no synthesis or bal-
ance between these two options. We will have to choose one or the other, 
and we cannot know for sure and in advance which is the better choice. 
Perhaps we have some truths right, or right enough, that they ought not 
to be contested as much as reaffirmed. Perhaps these truths or others of 
which we are absolutely convinced are downright wrong. 
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I am, for instance, totally convinced that pacifism is true. I am cer-
tain that God wants us to eschew violence. Therefore I think we should 
reiterate that truth as often and as compellingly as possible to anyone we 
can persuade to listen. But I also wonder what we may be missing in that 
witness. As we have construed pacifism in opposition to militarism, 
what have we put out of our view? Have we imagined peace witness too 
narrowly? Have we failed to live it in as challenging a manner as we 
could? 
If we pursued such inquiry, what would become not only of our 
pacifism but also of us? Who would we be? Who will we be if we do not 
engage in such inquiry? These questions could not be more difficult, be-
cause they are all about choosing one or the other of the options of an 
aporetic wihless that will surely have consequences for whether we 
speak the truth or falsehood, as well as implications for who we will be 
as Christians. 
The Aporetic Witness as Gift 
"Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name 
of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: Teaching them to 
observe all things whatsoever I have corrunanded you: and, 10, I am with 
you always, even unto the end of the world" (Matthew 28:19-20, KJV)· 
As we give ourselves over to the great commission, I wonder 
whether we aren't a bit like Abraham on hearing God's command that 
he sacrifice Isaac. What is more precious to us than the truths of Christi-
anity as they have come to us, whether through tradition or its traces? 
Jesus commands us to teach all nations; that is, to give these truths as 
gifts to others, so that they might transform those others as well. But 
what will come of these gifts and of us as we give them? Which gifts will 
we give? Will they help or harm? If they do harm, will we bear that re-
sponsibility? How will they be received? Will they be accepted or al-
tered? Will we be praised or martyred? 
If Derrida is right about what it means to make a gift to another, 
then we cannot answer these questions except to say that if our gift is to 
be a gift, if it is to be given in the spirit of God's infinite goodness, then 
we will have to give it expecting nothing in particular in return. Noth-
ing, perhaps, except a sense of not having given enough. 
We may not give in anticipation of gratitude or of self-
righteousness. When we give in that way we make no gift at all since we 
are really only making a trade of God's gifts for our satisfaction. In truth, 
we cannot say what the reception of our gift of wihless will be. The other 
may receive it as precious, may transform it into something else, may 
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take it as a threat. Since the other is, as we have said, truly other, that 
person is beyond our expectation, just as the future is beyond our pre-
diction. If we are to give this most precious gift, an.d we must, for Jesus 
tells us that it is not ours to keep, then we will have to give it as Abraham 
gave Isaac-in fear and trembling and faith. 
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